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CERCLA Liability
(continued from page 27)

ty of releases of federal causes of
action. However, in interpreting
the meaning and scope of the releases as intended by the parties,
state law may determine the content of federal law. If the application of state law would frustrate the
objectives of CERCLA, federal law
should be applied to interpret the
"'as is" clause.
In choosing not to apply state
law, the district court did not imply that the result under California
law would be different from the
result under federal law. The district court merely found it unnecessary to draw upon any provisions
of California law since the application of federal law would always
yield results consistent with the
objectives of the federal statute.
Therefore, the district court held
that it could rely solely upon federal law to interpret the "as is" clause
of the deed.
Applying federal law to NL's
claim, the district court distinguished the Marden decision. Unlike the purchaser in Marden, W &
R had no knowledge of the contamination at the time of purchase.
Because the conveyance between
NL and W & R occurred five years
prior to the enactment of CERCLA, the parties could not have
anticipated the possibility of response costs. In contrast to the
Marden parties who negotiated a
comprehensive settlement agreement with respect to the contaminated property, NL included a
standard "as is" clause in its conveyance of the property to W & R
without negotiating its specific
terms. Accordingly, the district
court found that NL originally intended the "as is " clause only to
protect itself from any breach of
warranty claims typically covered
by such clauses and not from CERCLA liability.
The district court noted that
permitting a responsible party to
avoid liability through a standard
"as is" clause would frustrate the
language and intent of CERCLA.
The sale of property subject to an
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"as is" provision is not one of the
three defenses to strict liability
defined in § 9607(b) of CERCLA.
Furthermore, § 9607(e) of CERCLA explicitly states that no hold
harmless conveyance is effective to
transfer liability away from a
strictly liable party. Most importantly, the district court noted that
one of the primary goals of CERCLA is to require responsible parties to bear the cleanup costs of the
hazardous conditions they created.
In accordance with the objectives of the CERCLA statute, the
district court held that NL could
not rely upon an "as is" clause of
the deed as a release from strict
liability under CERCLA. Therefore, the district court denied NL's
motion for summary judgment.
Rosemary G. Milew

DEBTOR ENTITLED TO
RESCIND CONSUMER
CREDIT TRANSACTION
FOR CREDITOR'S
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
DEBTOR'S RIGHT TO
CHOOSE INSURANCE
CARRIER
The United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that a creditor's
failure to inform the debtor of his
right to choose a home insurer
under a consumer credit transaction constituted a material violation of the Truth In Lending Act.
In re Moore, 117 B.R. 135
(Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1990). In Moore,
the creditor's error, although merely a technicality, made the debtor's
subsequent rescission of the loan
valid, and allowed him to collect
statutory damages, costs and attorneys' fees for the creditor's failure
to acknowledge properly the rescission.
Background
Russell L. Moore ("the Debtor"), an elderly widower, applied

for a loan from Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co. ("MidPenn"). As a condition of its loans,
Mid-Penn requires that borrowers
use their homes as collateral and
that the homes be insured. When
no mortgage is outstanding, MidPenn requires the borrower to
prove that the home is adequately
insured or to allow Mid-Penn to
obtain insurance. Because the
Debtor had paid off the original
mortgage on his home the year
before his loan application, MidPenn asked him to prove he had
insurance.
The Debtor told Mid-Penn that
he had insurance coverage from
the American Bankers Insurance
Company of Florida ("Bankers"),
but Mid-Penn later discovered that
the policy had lapsed. Mid-Penn
then attempted to renew the policy
for the Debtor and added the
amount of the renewal fee to the
balance of the principal borrowed.
Mid-Penn excluded the amount of
Mid-Penn's insurance renewal
payment in computing the finance
charge. When Bankers refused to
renew the Debtor's policy, MidPenn obtained alternative coverage through an insurance company
of its own choice, without asking
the Debtor whether he preferred a
specific company. This new policy
cost less than the Bankers policy,
so Mid-Penn refunded the difference to the Debtor. Mid-Penn then
gave the Debtor a Truth In Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. §§
1601-1700 (1988), disclosure statement which showed the payment
of the renewal fee as part of the
principal. Neither the TILA statement nor any other document
Mid-Penn gave to the Debtor,
however, mentioned that the Debtor could choose any company as
provider of the required insurance
coverage.
Approximately eighteen months
after obtaining the loan, the Debtor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
case. Mid-Penn filed a secured
Proof of Claim with the bankruptcy court, seeking the amount of the
principal, legal charges and additional interest. The Debtor attacked Mid-Penn's Proof of Claim,
alleging that prior to the bankrupt-
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cy, he had rescinded the loan in a
letter from his attorney to MidPenn. Mid-Penn claimed that its
president had replied to the letter,
stating that the rescission was not
valid.
The Bankruptcy Court's Ruling
Under the TILA and its regulations, insurance premiums written
in connection with consumer loan
transactions normally must be included in the finance charges rather than in the principal. 15 U.S.C §
1605(c) (1988); 12 C.F.R. §
226.4(d)(2) (1990). In the present
case, Mid-Penn excluded the insurance premiums from the finance
charge. Thus, Mid-Penn was required to inform the Debtor of his
right to choose which insurance
company insured his home. MidPenn alleged that the TILA only
required disclosure if the insurance
was purchased "by or through" a
creditor. Mid-Penn claimed that it
did not have to disclose to the
Debtor this right to choose an
insurer, as Mid-Penn merely renewed the Debtor's policy.
The bankruptcy court rejected
Mid-Penn's allegation. Although
Mid-Penn initially did attempt to
renew the Debtor's expired policy,
Mid-Penn ultimately obtained the
insurance from a company of its
own choice. Moreover, the court
found that the applicability of the
disclosure requirement did not depend on whether the insurance was
purchased "from or through" the
creditor. Instead, TILA requires
that the right to choose an insurance company always must be disclosed to the borrower if the premium is excluded from the finance
charge.
Furthermore, the court held that
the disclosure must be in the TILA
statement itself rather than communicated orally or through other
documents. Because the TILA
statement given to the Debtor did
not contain this disclosure, the
court found that Mid-Penn's actions constituted a violation of the
TILA, albeit a technical one made
in good faith. The technical nature
of the TILA violation and the good
faith intentions of the creditor,
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however, were irrelevant. The
court stated that subsequent to the
simplification of TILA in 1980, all
violations which remain viable under the amended TILA, even if
technical, entitle the Debtor to full
remedies provided by the law. In re
Brown, 106 B.R. 852, 853, 856-857
(Bankr. E.D.Pa. 1989).
The court held that this material
violation of the TILA permitted
the Debtor to rescind the loan.
Mid-Penn's improper response to
the rescission allowed the Debtor
to recover statutory damages and
recoupment in the same amount,
relieved him of liability for the
finance charge and eliminated
Mid-Penn's security interest.
The court held that the Debtor
was obligated to repay only the
amount he actually received from
Mid-Penn. Further, the Debtor
could credit his recoupment and
previous payments against this
amount. Therefore, because the
court calculated that the sum of the
recoupment and the payments already made was greater than the
obligation, it offset Mid-Penn's
claim entirely. The court also
awarded the Debtor attorneys' fees
and costs.
Suzi Guemmer

PUBLIC UTILITIES'
RECOUPMENT OF
CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS
THROUGH RATE
STRUCTURE VIOLATES
THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
In Cahill v. Public Serv. Comm.,
76 N.Y.2d 102, 556 N.Y.S.2d 840
(N.Y. 1990), the New York Court
of Appeals held that a public service commission's policy of allowing utilities to pass along the cost of
corporate charitable contributions
to ratepayers violated the ratepayers' first amendment rights. The
policy violated the ratepayers' first
amendment rights because it com-

pelled the ratepayers to contribute
financially to the charitable organizations and identified the ratepayers with the causes supported by
the organizations. The court rejected the utilities' argument that the
compelled recoupment of charitable contributions from ratepayers
was analogous to the government's
use of tax money for purposes that
some taxpayers find objectionable.
The court explained that while the
government has the authority to
use tax money for purposes that
taxpayers find objectionable, it
cannot delegate its authority to tax
to publicly regulated enterprises.
Background
The New York Public Service
Commission ("PSC") is a state
agency which has total regulatory
and rate-fixing authority over public utilities in New York. Prior to
1970, the PSC prohibited utilities
in New York from recouping corporate charitable contributions
from ratepayers. As a result, the
utilities and their shareholders absorbed these costs.
In 1970, the PSC reversed its
policy and permitted the utilities
to pass along the costs of charitable
contributions to ratepayers. The
individual utilities treated the contributions as utility operating expenses and incorporated these
costs into the utility's rate structure. In accordance with the new
rules, New York Telephone ("NY
Tel") and Rochester Gas and Electric ("RG & E") sought to recoup
from their ratepayers charitable
expenditures made to political, religious and other organizations.
Joseph Cahill ("Cahill"), a customer of NYTel, brought an Article 78 proceeding against PSC and
the utilities, contending that the
charitable contribution recoupment policy violated his first
amendment right to free speech
and association. Cahill argued that
the policy compelled him to fund
and to affiliate with organizations
espousing political, religious and
moral beliefs contrary to his own.
Additionally, Cahill objected to
the fact that the utilities decided
(continued on page 30)
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